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1. Introduction
In this paper we focus our attention on partial possibility assessments and on aspects regarding inference: conditioning,
coherence and coherent enlargement. The notion of conditioning is a problem of long-standing interest, in fact various
definitions of conditional possibility are present in the literature (see, e.g., [18,19,25,28,30,38,47–49]). By analogy with
Kolmogorovian probabilistic approach, most definitions have in common the fact that conditional possibility Π(E|H) is
obtained as a derived concept from joint and marginal possibilities Π(E ∧ H) and Π(H): in fact, it is essentially defined as
a solution of the equation
Π(E ∧ H) = min{x, Π(H)}.
Nevertheless the aboveequationmaynothave aunique solution: due to the lackof strictmonotonicity ofminimumoperation
the uniqueness of the solution is not guaranteed even if events with zero possibility are not present. This goal is achieved by
imposing other particular principles (as, e.g., minimum specificity [28]) which give rise to different definitions of conditional
possibility. Recently, in [3,4] (following de Finetti’s conditional probability framework see, e.g., [21]) a more general notion
of conditional possibility has been introduced, as a primitive concept: the conditional possibility is directly defined as a
function on a set (with a suitable algebraic structure) of conditional events, in such a way thatΠ(E|H)makes sense for any
pair of events E and H, with H = ∅, and it must satisfy proper axioms.
A comparison of the aforementioned conditioning notions by using the methodology of theory of measurement [41] is
carried out in [15], where the relations “not more possible than” agreeing with a specific conditional possibility are studied
(see also [16] for a comparison with other conditional uncertainty measures).
The axiomatic definition of conditional possibility necessarily refers to a set of conditional events endowedwith a logical
structure: this fact can make the model not sufficiently flexible for the applications. In fact, in many real situations the
events of interest give rise to arbitrary sets. However, recently a well founded theory of coherent (conditional) possibilities
has been developed (see for instance [4,14,17,33]). Coherent possibility approach allows to assign possibilistic evaluations
on an arbitrary set of (conditional) events and then to extend it to the set of all events of interest. The coherent values for
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the possibility of the new events turns out to be represented by intervals, rather than single numbers. In this paper we
give a new characterization of coherent conditional possibilities, which allows to elaborate efficient methods for checking
coherence and for extending the assessment to new events: we briefly discuss about the computational aspects of the
proposed methods.
Furthermore, taking as a reference diagnosis procedures (see, for example, [26]) and by following the idea exposed in [7]
for a probabilistic framework, we present a procedure for handling uncertainty in the process of medical diagnosis by using
coherent conditional possibility.
Werefer toapossibility assessmentona familyofhypotheses (whichcorrespond topossiblediseasesHi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n),
that could explain a given initial piece of information referring to the specific situation (anamnesis) anda relevant conditional
possibilityΠ(E|K), where each event K is a possible disease, which is in someway related to the given hypotheses Hi, while
E is an evidence coming from a suitable evidential test.
In this setting no structure and no simplifying and unrealistic assumptions (such as mutual exclusiveness and exhaus-
tivity or independence) are imposed to this family of events and the possibility assessment on the given hypotheses is not
necessarily complete: the events are chosen in fact as the most natural, according to the doctor’s experience and informa-
tion. Also the conditional possibility Π(E|K) can be partial, moreover can be defined on events different from the previous
diseases.
An inferential method for the coherent conditional possibility framework can or need to sometimes capture probabilistic
information. In fact, both the assessmentsΠ(Hi) andΠ(E|K) can either be assessed directly by using a possibilisticmodel, or
can derive from some inferential probabilistic process. First of all, as shown in [11–13] (see also [22,27,32]), given a coherent
probability on a set of events, by extending this assessment to another set, we can get different measures as e.g. plausibility
[37,11] or possibility [29,13] and this depends on the logical constraints on the two sets of events. Moreover, in this paper,
we show that any probabilistic likelihood P(E|·) can be regarded also as coherent conditional possibility Π(E|·).
In fact, when we restrict to F = {E|Hi}where the Hi’s are a partition of the sure event, any coherent conditional probability
assessment onF is also a coherent conditional possibility and vice versa. Hence, a probabilistic likelihood and a possibilistic
one on F are indistinguishable from a syntactic point of view since they satisfy the same properties.
2. Decomposable measures
Given a Boolean algebra B, a function
ϕ : B → [0, 1]
is ⊕-decomposable if ϕ(Ω) = 1, ϕ(∅) = 0 and there exists a commutative, associative and increasing operation ⊕ from
ϕ(B) × ϕ(B) (ϕ(B) denotes the range of ϕ(·) on B) to [0, 1], admitting 0 as neutral element and such that the following
condition holds: for every Ei, Ej ∈ B, with Ei ∧ Ej = ∅,
ϕ(Ei ∨ Ej) = ϕ(Ei) ⊕ ϕ(Ej). (1)
Among decomposable measures the most known are probabilities (with⊕ the ordinary sum) and possibilities (with⊕ the
maximum).
Usually in the literature conditional measures are presented as a derived notion of unconditional ones, but this is a
restrictive view of conditioning. It is instead essential to adopt a general definition of decomposable conditional uncertainty
measure (introduced in [8]).
Definition 1. Let E = B × H, with B a Boolean algebra and H an additive set (i.e., closed with respect to finite logical
sums), such that ∅ ∈ H ⊂ B and ϕ a real function defined on E . Let us consider any pair of binary commutative, associative
and increasing operations (⊕,
) from ϕ(E) × ϕ(E) to R+, having respectively 0 and 1 as neutral elements, and with 

distributive over ⊕. The function ϕ is a (⊕,
)-decomposable conditional measure if the following conditions hold:
(C1) ϕ(E|H) = ϕ(E ∧ H|H), for every E ∈ B and H ∈ H,
(C2) for any H ∈ H the function ϕ(·|H) is a⊕-decomposable measure,
(C3) for every A ∈ B, E ∧ H ∈ H,
ϕ(E ∧ A|H) = ϕ(E|H) 
 ϕ(A|E ∧ H).
In the case⊕,
 are equal to the usual sum and product, respectively, we get a conditional probability (in the sense of de
Finetti [21], see also [24,42]). When⊕,
 coincide with the maximum and the minimum, respectively, we get a conditional
possibility (in the general sense of [3,4]) and when ⊕ is the maximum and 
 is any T-norm we obtain T-conditional
possibility (see [17]). In the following we refer only to conditional probabilities and possibilities.
We notice that it is not possible to construct a (⊕,
)-decomposable conditional measure by taking as starting point just
one decomposable measure, since a conditional measure is essentially a large class of⊕-decomposable measures, linked by
(C3).
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This is well known in the particular case where ϕ(·|·) is a conditional probability: in fact, when P0(·) = P(·|Ω) is
strictly positive onH, any conditional probability can be derived as a ratio (Kolmogorov’s definition) bymeans of this unique
“unconditional” probability P0; while in all other cases to get a similar representation we need to resort to a family of
unconditional probabilities (see [42,6]), each of them defined where the previous ones are equal to zero.
A similar problem arises for conditional possibilities, in fact it is not possible to construct a conditional possibility by
just one possibility. Indeed, since min is not strictly increasing, we need to resort to a family of unconditional possibilities
[14,17], even if there is no conditioning event of zero possibility (see next section). We remark that this notion of condi-
tioning is very general since some other notions, such as those given in [30,38,23,18], can be regarded from a syntactical
point of view as particular cases. However, the conditioning definitions introduced in [48,49] do not satisfy axioms of
Definition 1.
3. Coherence and extension
The above definition of (conditional) decomposable measure is strictly based on the Boolean structure of the domains.
Actually, in real problems, such as medical diagnosis, the logical conditions on the domain can be unrealistic: in fact, the
expert (or decision maker) usually has information and interest only on a bunch of (conditional) events. The concept of
coherence, introduced by de Finetti [21] in probability theory, has the fundamental role to manage partial assessments of
an uncertainty measure and its enlargement. In other words it is a tool to check consistency of a function defined on an
arbitrary set of (conditional) events with a specific uncertainty measure and to make inference in the general sense, that is
to extend the function to new events by preserving consistency.
We remark that it is relevant to study coherence in a general context where information can be expressed by different
uncertainty measures. This fact can happen at the beginning of the knowledge acquisition process or it is obtained during
the inference process, wherewe need to deal with families of uncertaintymeasures. In particular, if we start from a coherent
probability assessment P on a set of events and we extend it to other events, under suitable hypothesis (see Section 5 and
[12,13,31]), we can obtain a possibility measure as upper bound of the family of probabilities extending P.
Definition 2. Given an arbitrary set F = {Ei|Hi} of conditional events, a real function ϕ on F is an assessment coherent
with a (⊕,
)-decomposable conditional measure if there exists a (⊕,
)-decomposable conditional measure ϕ′(·|·) on
E = B × H, with B the Boolean algebra spanned by the events {Ei,Hi} and H the additive set spanned by the events {Hi},
extending ϕ.
Obviously, in the unconditional case a function on F = {E1, . . . , En} (where Hi = Ω for any i = 1, . . . , n) is coherent
with a⊕-decomposable measure if it can be extended on the algebra B, spanned by F , as⊕-decomposable measure.
We recall that coherence for conditional probability has been characterized in [6] (see also [9]). A characterization of
coherence for conditional possibilities has been given in [17].While in [48] a different coherence notion has been introduced
by referring to another aforementioned notion of conditioning.
In the following sections we provide a further characterization of the notion introduced in [14], more appealing in order
to provide an algorithm for checking coherence.
We remark an important feature of coherence: any coherent conditional possibility (probability) assessment on a family
F can be extended to any F ′ ⊃ F , by preserving coherence (see for instance for probability [9] and for possibility [17]). In
particular, the coherent values for any new conditional event lie on a closed interval.
3.1. Coherent possibility assessments
Westart from coherent assessments on a family of unconditional events. LetF = {E1, . . . , En}, be a finite family of events
and denote by C = {C1, . . . , Cm} the set of the atoms generated by these events (i.e. made up with all possible conjunctions
E∗1 ∧ E∗2 ∧ · · · ∧ E∗n , different from the impossible event ∅, obtained by replacing E∗i (for i = 1, 2, . . . , n) with the event Ei
or its contrary Eci ). By Definition 2 a function Π : F → [0, 1] is coherent (or consistent) with a possibility if there exists
(at least) a solution of the following system, where xr = Π ′(Cr) with Cr ∈ C, and Π ′ a possibility defined on the algebra
spanned by C extending Π ,
S =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
Cr⊆Ei
xr = Π(Ei), for all Ei ∈ F ,
max
Cr∈C
xr = 1,
xr ≥ 0, for all Cr ∈ C.
(2)
Instead of solving directly the system S, the coherence ofΠ can be checked by means of purely logical conditions, as shown
in the following theorem (for an equivalent characterization, see [2]).
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Theorem 1. Let Π be a function on F = {E1, . . . , En} and, for any value γ ∈ (0, 1], put L(γ ) = ∧Π(Ej)<γ Ecj . If Π(Ej) ≥ γ
for every event Ej ∈ F , then L(γ ) = Ω . The function Π is an assessment coherent with a possibility if and only if the following
conditions hold:
(1) for each Ei = ∅, then Π(Ei) = 0,
(2) for each Ei = ∅, then Ei ∧ L(Π(Ei)) = ∅,
(3) ifmaxj Π(Ej) < 1, then L(1) = ∅.
Proof. Let C = {C1, . . . , Cm} be the set of the atoms generated by F . Firstly we prove that if Π satisfies conditions (1)–(3),
then system S admits solution. Without loss of generality, denote with πi = Π(Ei) and suppose that Π(Ei) ≤ Π(Ei+1) for
any i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Note that for every j > 1, it is Ej ∧ (∧πk<πj Eck
) = ∅, then consider the following assessment on C:
Π ′(Cr) = Π(E1) for all the atoms Cr (if there are) on E1; for every j = 2, . . . , n Π ′(Cs) = Π(Ej) for all the atoms Cs in
Ej ∧ (∧πk<πj Eck
)
. FinallyΠ ′(Ct) = 1 for the atoms (if there are) in∧ni=1 Eci . It is easy to prove that, since conditions (1)–(3)
hold, xr = Π ′(Cr) is a solution of the system S, so the assessment is coherent with a possibility.
Conversely, if the assessment is coherent with a possibility, then the system S admits a solution and so for any possible
event Ej there exists an atom in Ej ∧ (∧πk<πj Eck
) = Ej ∧ L(Π(Ej)) satisfying the equation related to Π(Ej). Moreover, if
Π(En) < 1, then necessarily
∧n
i=1 Ec1 = L(1) = ∅. 
3.2. Extending coherent possibility assessments
For any event A ∈ F , we denote by A∗ and A∗, respectively, the maximal event logically dependent on F (i.e. A ∈ B),
contained in A, and the minimal event logically dependent on F containing A, respectively. In other words
A∗ =
∨
Ci⊆A
Ci, A
∗ = ∨
Ci∧A =∅
Ci.
Obviously, A∗ ⊆ A ⊆ A∗, and, if A is logically dependent on F , then A∗ = A = A∗.
Let F = {E1, . . . , En} be a finite set of events and Π a coherent possibility assessment on F , then Π can be extended
as a coherent possibility on any finite F∗ ⊃ F . Moreover, if F∗ = F ∪ {A}, then the set of coherent values for A is a closed
interval [π∗(A), π∗(A)], where
π∗(A) = π∗(A∗) = min
Π ′∈ΠΠ
′(A∗)
and
π∗(A) = π∗(A∗) = max
Π ′∈ΠΠ
′(A∗),
and the minimum and maximum are computed over the setΠ of all possible extensions Π ′ ofΠ on B (see [17]).
From the above discussion, a procedure for finding the set of coherent values for any new event A easily follows: we need
to find the extreme values min
(
maxCr⊆A xr
)
and max
(
maxCr∧A =∅ xr
)
under the system S.
Remark 1. Given a coherent possibility assessment Π on a set F , the intervals of coherence for some new events can be
computed in parallel and then by choosing for every event the maximum of the relevant interval of coherence the obtained
measure is again a possibility extendingΠ [17]. In otherwords, contrary to probability, the “upper possibility" is a possibility
by max-decomposability property.
Remark 2. By extending a coherent possibility assessment defined on F to {En+1, . . . , En+k} step by step, if we choose
anytime the maximum value of the interval then the relevant extended possibility Π ′ is independent of the order of the
sequence. In any other case the relevant extended possibility Π ′, obtained by choosing at each step a value less than the
upper bound of the coherent interval depends on the order (see Example 1).
In the following we show how to compute the extremes π∗(A), π∗(A) by means of a search problem on a finite set of
values, without recurring to a mathematical programming.
Proposition 1. Let Π be a coherent possibility on F = {E1, . . . , En}. Consider any event A ∈ F , then the coherent possibility
interval [π∗(A), π∗(A)] is such that π∗(A), π∗(A) belong to
V = {0, 1, Π(Ei), i = 1, . . . , n}.
Proof. If π is a coherent extension for Π ′(A) and π ∈ V , then there are two consecutive values π ′, π ′′ ∈ V such that π ′ <
π < π ′′, which are coherent extensions of Π on A. Indeed, π∗(A) = 1 if∧i Eci ∧ A = ∅, and π∗(A) = maxEi∧A =∅{Π(Ei)}
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otherwise. Analogously,π∗(A) = 1 if allΠ(Ei) < 1 and∧i Eci ⊆ A, andπ∗(A) = maxEi⊆A{Π(Ei), 0} otherwise. So choosing
forπ∗(A)orπ∗(A) a value not inV contradicts thehypothesis ofmaximality orminimality, respectively, of these twoextreme
values. 
Proposition 1 gives rise to a method to compute lower and upper bounds with at most n calls to the coherence method.
More precisely, for the lower bound we start by checking coherence of the assessment {Π(A) = k, Π(Ei), i = 1, . . . , n},
with k ∈ {0, 1, Π(Ei), i = 1, . . . , n} and the lower bound coincideswith thefirst coherent value (according to the increasing
order of the possibility values in the set).
The computation complexity of π∗(A) for a given event A can be reduced:
Theorem 2. Given a set F of events, a coherent assessment Π on F and a possible event A ∈ F , logically dependent on F , the
maximum coherent value π∗(A) for A is the maximum value πj ∈ V such that A ∧ L(πj) = ∅.
Proof. Order the events inF with respect to their possibility values, then letπi = Π(Ei) for i = 1, . . . , n, so thatπi ≤ πi+1
for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Moreover, put π0 = 0 and πn+1 = 1. If A ∧ L(πn+1) = ∅, then, there is a coherent extension of Π
giving value 1 to A from Theorem 1. Otherwise, Ac ∧ L(1) = ∅ since A is a possible event and L(1) = ∅ from coherence of
Π on F . Now let us show, by denoting with πj the maximum value in V such that A ∧ L(πj) ∧ Ej = ∅, that πj = π∗(A).
Then, Ei ∧ Ac ∧ L(πi) = ∅, for i = j + 1, . . . , n, since A ∧ L(πi) = ∅, and therefore Ei ∧ A ∧ L(πi) = ∅. In fact, if also
Ei ∧ Ac ∧ L(πi) were impossible, then it would follow that Ei ∧ L(πi) = ∅, contradicting the coherence of Π . Theorem 1
(together Remark 1) implies that π∗(A) coincides with πj . 
Example 1. Consider the events E1, E2, E3 satisfying the logical relation E1 ⊆ E2 and the assessment Π(E1) = 0.3,
Π(E2) = 0.4 and Π(E3) = 0.6. The coherence with a possibility follows from Theorem 1 since E1 ∧ L(0.3) = E1 = ∅,
E2 ∧ L(0.4) = E2 ∧ Ec1 = ∅, E3 ∧ L(0.6) = E3 ∧ Ec1 ∧ Ec2 = ∅ and L(1) = Ec1 ∧ Ec2 ∧ Ec3 = ∅.
Given now two new events E4, E5 with E4 = E2∧E3 and E5 = E1∧E3, we can first extendΠ to E4 by using the procedure
suggested by Proposition 1 and Theorem 2. For the lower boundwe start checking the coherence of the enlarged assessment
{Π(E4) = 0, Π(E1) = 0.3, Π(E2) = 0.4, Π(E3) = 0.6} and since E4 ∧ L(0) = E4 = ∅, E1 ∧ L(0.3) = E1 ∧ Ec4 = ∅,
E2 ∧L(0.4) = E2 ∧Ec1 ∧Ec4 = ∅, E3 ∧L(0.6) = E3 ∧Ec1 ∧Ec2 ∧Ec4 = ∅ andL(1) = Ec1 ∧Ec2 ∧Ec3 ∧Ec4 = ∅, the assessment is
coherent and so π∗(E4) = 0. For the upper bound, being E4 ∧ L(k) = ∅ for k ∈ {0.6, 1} and E4 ∧ L(0.4) = ∅, we conclude
π∗(E4) = 0.4.
Thus we get Π(E4) ∈ [0, 0.4] and by choosing Π(E4) = 0.1, the extension of the possibility assessment Π on{E1, . . . , E4} to E5 is carried on in the same way. Then, the coherent interval for Π(E5) (since E5 ⊆ E4) is [0, 0.1].
Vice versa, by extending first Π to E5 we get Π(E5) ∈ [0, 0.3]. Moreover, if we choose Π(E5) = 0.2 then the further
extension of Π on {E1, E2, E3, E5} to E4 gives out to the interval Π(E4) ∈ [0.2, 0.4].
3.3. Coherent conditional possibility assessments
To characterize coherent conditional possibility assessments we recall the concept of agreeing class (see [14,17]).
Definition 3. Let B be a finite algebra and C0 be the set of atoms in B.
The classP = {Π0, . . . , Πk} of possibilities defined onB is said nested if the following conditions hold for any j = 1, . . . , k:
• Πj(C) = Πj−1(C) if C ∈ Cj \ Hj (j > 0),• Πj−1(C) ≤ Πj(C) ≤ 1 if C ∈ Hj (j > 0),• Πj(C) = 0 for all the atoms C ∈ C0 \ Cj ,• for any C ∈ C0 there exists a (unique) j = 0, . . . , k such that Πj(C) = 1,
where Cj = {C ∈ Cj−1 : Πj−1(C) < 1} and
Hj = {Ci ∈ Cj :  C ∈ Cj s.t. Πj−1(C) > Πj−1(Ci)}.
Notice that Hj (with j > 0) is actually the set of the elements of Cj with the “highest” value of possibility Πj−1, which
potentially have possibility Πj equal to 1 (see the second condition of Definition 3). Moreover, those atoms with possibility
1 underΠj have possibility 0 underΠj+1. In fact, the aim of this iterative construction is to increase the possibility of atoms
up to 1 and in the next steps force them to have possibility 0.
Definition 4. A class P = {Π0, . . . , Πk} of possibilities on B is agreeing with a coherent conditional possibility Π(·|·) on
an arbitrary finite set F (such that for any E|H ∈ F one has E,H ∈ B) if it is nested and, for every E|H ∈ F , Π(E|H) is a
solution of all the equations
Πα(E ∧ H) = min{x, Πα(H)} (3)
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for α = 0, . . . , j∗ + 1 with j∗ = max{j : Πj(H) < 1}, and Π(E|H) is the unique solution of the above equation for
α = j∗ + 1.
We give now a characterization theorem, which adds an equivalent condition (condition d)) to that proved in [14].
Theorem 3. Let F = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn} be a finite set of conditional events, C0 and B denote, respectively, the set of atoms and
the algebra spanned by {E1,H1, . . . , En,Hn}.
For a real function Π : F → [0, 1], the following statements are equivalent:
(a) Π is a coherent conditional possibility assessment on F ;
(b) there exists (at least) a nested class P = {Π0, . . . , Πk} of possibilities on B, such that for every Ei|Hi ∈ F one has that
Π(Ei|Hi) is a solution of all the equations
Πβ(Ei ∧ Hi) = min{x, Πβ(Hi)} (4)
for every β such that Πβ(Hi) ≤ 1;
(c) there exists a sequence of compatible systems Sα (α = 0, . . . , k), with unknowns xαr ,
Sα =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
Cr⊆Ei∧Hi
xαr = min
{
Π(Ei|Hi), max
Cr⊆Hi
xαr
}
, if max
Cr⊆Hi
xα−1r < 1,
xαr ≥ xα−1r , if Cr ∈ Hα,
xαr = xα−1r , if Cr ∈ Cα \ Hα,
max
Cr∈Cα
xαr = 1,
xαr ≥ 0, for all Cr ∈ Cα,
(5)
where xα (with rth component xαr ) denotes a solution of the system Sα , Cα = {Cr ∈ Cα−1 : xα−1r < 1} and
Hα = {Cr ∈ Cα : xα−1r = maxCj∈Cα xα−1j }, moreover x−1r = 0 for any Cr in C0.
(d) there is a sequence of systems Sα (α = 0, . . . , k), with unknowns xαr , as in condition c), and each system Sα admits a
solution xα with components xαr taking values in V = {0, 1} ∪ {Π(Ei|Hi) : i = 1, . . . , n}.
Proof. The equivalence among conditions (a), (b) and (c) is proved in [14].
Now we prove the equivalence between conditions (c) and (d). Obviously, condition (d) implies condition (c), since (d)
gives rise to a particular solution of Sα . Then, we need to show that if Sα is a compatible system, then it admits a solution
with values in V . Let xα be any solution of Sα and for any Cr ∈ Cα define
x¯αr = min{v ∈ V : v ≥ xαr }.
It follows that
max
Cr⊆Ei∧Hi
x¯αr = min
{
v ∈ V : v ≥ max
Cr⊆Ei∧Hi
xαr
}
and analogously
max
Cr⊆Hi
x¯αr = min
{
v ∈ V : v ≥ max
Cr⊆Hi
xαr
}
for all Ei|Hi ∈ F such that Πα−1(Hi) < 1. Hence, if maxCr⊆Ei∧Hi xαr < Π(Ei|Hi), then maxCr⊆Hi xαr = maxCr⊆Ei∧Hi xαr , and
so the same equality needs to hold also under x¯αr . Otherwise maxCr⊆Ei∧Hi xαr = Π(Ei|Hi) = maxCr⊆Ei∧Hi x¯αr . This implies
that x¯α is a solution of Sα and its components take values just in V . 
Remark 3. If system Sα is compatible, then the set of solutions contains the upper envelope of its elements: in fact, the
maximumof a set of possibilities is again a possibility.Moreover, fromTheorem3 (condition d)) the values of the components
of the maximal solution are in V = {0, 1} ∪ {Π(Ei|Hi) : i = 1, . . . , n}.
Theorem 3 requires to find a set of compatible systems Sα recursively defined, each of them containing equations and
inequalities depending on the solution chosen for the previous system Sα−1. This implies that, contrary to probabilistic
framework, it is possible, even in the case of coherent assessments, to find sequences of systems not all of them solvable, as
the following example shows:
Example 2. Let E1, E2, E3 be three logically independent events and consider the assessment
Π(E1|E2) = 0.2, Π(E1|E3) = 0.6, Π(E2 ∨ E3|E1) = 0.4.
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The relevant atoms are
C1 = E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3, C2 = E1 ∧ E2 ∧ Ec3, C3 = E1 ∧ Ec2 ∧ E3, C4 = E1 ∧ Ec2 ∧ Ec3,
C5 = Ec1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3, C6 = Ec1 ∧ E2 ∧ Ec3, C7 = Ec1 ∧ Ec2 ∧ E3, C8 = Ec1 ∧ Ec2 ∧ Ec3
and in order to check the coherence, consider the system⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{x01, x02} = min{0.2,max{x01, x02, x05, x06}},
max{x01, x03} = min{0.6,max{x01, x03, x05, x07}},
max{x01, x02, x03} = min{0.4,max{x01, x02, x03, x04}},
x0r ≥ 0, r = 1, . . . , 8,
max
r=1,...,8{x
0
r } = 1.
A solution of the above system is
x0 = (0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 1, 0.3, 1, 0.3, 1)
that induces the following system⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{x11, x13} = min{0.6,max{x11, x13, x15, x17}},
x11 = 0.1,
x12 = 0.2,
x15 = 0.3,
x17 = 0.3,
x13 ≥ 0.4,
max{x11, x12, x13, x15, x17} = 1,
which has no solution.
However, the coherence can be proved by choosing the following solution
x0 = (0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 1, 0.4, 1, 0.4, 1)
of the first system, which induces the following consistent system⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{x11, x13} = min{0.6,max{x11, x13, x15, x17}},
x11 = 0.2,
x12 = 0.2,
x13 ≥ 0.4,
x15 ≥ 0.4,
x17 ≥ 0.4,
max{x11, x12, x13, x15, x17} = 1.
The example remarks that a direct application of Theorem 3 does not allow to check coherence efficiently, therefore it is
necessary to find some particular strategies to avoid these unpleasant situations.
Furthermore, the sequences of systems could be exponentially long, in fact in the worst case we can have that in each
system only one atom achieves the value 1. To avoid these problems we provide the following different characterization.
Theorem 4. Let F = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn} be a finite set of conditional events, C0 and B denote, respectively, the set of atoms and
the algebra spanned by {E1,H1, . . . , En,Hn}. A real function Π : F → [0, 1] is a coherent conditional possibility assessment
on F if and only if the following systems S∗γ , for γ = 0, . . . , h are compatible
S∗γ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
Cr⊆Ei∧Hi
zγr = min
{
Π(Ei|Hi), max
Cr⊆Hi
zγr
}
, if max
Cr⊆Hi
z
γ−1
r < 1,
z
γ
r ≥ zγ−1r , if Cr ∈ H˜γ ,
z
γ
r = zγ−1r , if Cr ∈ C˜γ \ H˜γ ,
max
Cr∈C˜γ
zγr = 1,
z
γ
r ≥ 0, for each Cr ∈ C˜γ ,
(6)
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where zγ−1 (with rth component zγ−1r ) is the maximal solution (i.e. the most conservative) of system S∗γ−1, C˜γ = {Cr ∈ C˜γ−1 :
Cr ⊆ H1γ }, H˜γ = {Cr ∈ C˜γ :  Cj ⊆ H1γ s.t. zγ−1j > zγ−1r }, H1γ is the disjunction of the Hi such that maxCr⊆Hi zγ−1r < 1,
moreover z−1r = 0 for each Cr ∈ C˜0.
Proof. Since the sequence {S∗γ } is a particular sequence {Sα} (where the unknowns associated only to some atoms not
contained in the remaining conditioning events do not appear), if the systems S∗γ have solutions, then from Theorem 3 the
assessment is a coherent conditional possibility.
On the other hand, notice that by the solutions of the sequence {Sα} it is always possible to compute the solutions of the
modified sequence {S∗γ }. In fact, Sα have the same form as S∗γ , but for α and γ greater than 0 they can differ since in S∗γ we
have the constraint of choosing at each step the maximal solution, i.e. the most conservative (and it is possible since the
maximum of two possibilities is known to be a possibility). Hence, by taking at any step the maximal solution, we have as
few constraints as possible and then if some system S∗γ has no solution, then there is no sequence {Sα} as in Theorem 3 and
so the assessment is not the restriction of any conditional possibility. This implies the thesis. 
Remark 3 implies that for each system S∗γ we are able to look for the maximal solution taking values only in V .
3.4. Extending coherent conditional possibility assessments
In this section we study the problem of extending a coherent conditional possibility in the general case, while in the next
sections we study some particular cases where it is possible to apply a rule in the style of “Bayes formula”.
In order to extend a given possibility assessment Π on F we refer to the following two points:
(i) find all coherent extensions on E|H when E|H ∈ B × Bo, with Bo = B \ {∅} (i.e. E ∧ H and H are logically dependent
on F);
(ii) extend this result to any conditional event F|K (i.e. F|K ∈ B × Bo).
The extension of a coherent conditional possibility assessment Π on F to a conditional event F|K (i.e. F|K ∈ B × Bo) is
computed by following the same line of a coherent unconditional possibility assessment, recalled in Subsection 3.1. Then,
we need to consider the maximal (and minimal) conditional event in B× Bo contained in (containing) F|K , with respect to
the following relation of inclusion between conditional events (see, e.g. [9,35])
A|H ⊆∗ B|K ⇐⇒ A ∧ H ⊆ B ∧ K and Bc ∧ K ⊆ Ac ∧ H.
By denoting, for each event D, (D)′ = ∨Cr⊆D Cr and (D)′′ = ∨Cr∧D =∅ Cr, the maximum (with respect to ⊆∗) event
contained in F|K is
(F ∧ K)′|
(
(F ∧ K)′ ∨ (Fc ∧ K)′′
)
and the minimum event containing F|K is
(F ∧ K)′′|
(
(F ∧ K)′′ ∨ (Fc ∧ K)′
)
.
Hence, it is always possible to refer to the extension of Π to events E|H ∈ B × Bo (i.e. E ∧ H and H are logically dependent
on F), i.e. to the case (i).
In this case, we evaluate all the corresponding values Π(E|H), and then we take the minimum π∗ and the maximum
π∗ with respect to all the possible extensions of Π , or equivalently with respect to all the agreeing classes. This means to
consider the sequence of systems Sα and to find the maximum and the minimum coherent value for Π(E|H) under all the
possible solutions of the systems Sα .
This problem is equivalent to find the maximum index α∗ such that the solutions xα of the optimal problemminimizing(
maxCr⊆E∧H xαr
)
under Sα (α = 0, . . . , α∗) are such that maxCr⊆E∧H xαr = maxCr⊆H xαr . The aim is, in fact, to eliminate as
many constraints as possible in a way to get the extremal coherent values forΠ(E|H) by forcing the corresponding equation
to be trivially satisfied.
Remark 4. We notice that π∗(E|H) and π∗(E|H) can assume values only in the set V = {0, 1, Π(Ei|Hi), i = 1, . . . , n}.
Similarly to theunconditional case, theextremevaluesπ∗(E|H)andπ∗(E|H) canbe foundwitha searchmethod.However,
to compute the upper bound π∗(E|H) for the extension ofΠ on E|H (except the trivial case E ∧ H = ∅) it is possible to use
a faster method based on the next remark.
Remark 5. Solving the sequence of systems related to Π on F with the additional constraint
max
Cr⊆E∧H
xαr = max
Cr⊆H
xαr (7)
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is equivalent to check the coherence of the assessmentΠ ′ onF ∪{E|H}. Note thatΠ ′ onF ∪{E|H} extendsΠ and gives 1 to
E|H. The assessment Π ′ is coherent in the case that all the systems of sequence admit solutions: in this case π∗(E|H) = 1.
Otherwise, the first system S∗β with no solution becomes compatible by deleting the constraint (7), and so there always exists
a maximal solution x¯β of S∗β such that
max
Cr⊆E∧H
x¯βr < max
Cr⊆H
x¯βr . (8)
Hence, π∗(E|H) is maxCr⊆E∧H x¯βr .
3.5. A particular case of extension: possibilistic Bayesian inference
Let us consider the problem of making inference on the conditional events {Hi|E}i=1,...,n, starting from a possibilistic
assessment on F1 = {Hi}i=1,...,n and a conditional possibilistic assessment on F2 = {E|Hi}i=1,...,n. In order to make
inference, first of all, it is necessary to consider all the information together on the whole family F = F1 ∪ F2. When the
elements of F1 form a partition, then the global coherence is assured, as shown in the following result. We recall that a
similar result holds for coherent conditional probabilities, see [7].
Theorem 5. LetH = {Hi}i=1,...,n be a finite partition of Ω and Π a possibility distribution onH.
Let E be an arbitrary event, C = {E|Hi}i=1,...,n and f : C → [0, 1] any function such that
f (E|Hi) = 0 if E ∧ Hi = ∅ and f (E|Hi) = 1 if Hi ⊆ E (9)
(and f assumes any value in [0, 1] for any E|Hi, with∅ = E∧Hi = E). Then the global assessment {f , Π} is a coherent conditional
possibility onH ∪ C.
Proof. The proof directly follows from Theorem 3. 
Then, as already remarked, the coherent assessment can be extended by preserving coherence.
Now consider a coherent possibility assessment on F = {E|Hi,Hi}i=1,...,n, we can apply, in order to update the “prior
possibility”, the following rule that is the counterpart of “Bayes rule"
min{Π(Hi|E),max
j
{min(Π(E|Hj),Π(Hj))}} = min(Π(E|Hi),Π(Hi)). (10)
Differently from the probabilistic case, the “posterior possibility” Π(·|E) could be not unique on some Hi, as shown in the
following example.
Example3. Consider fourpossible incompatible andexhaustive causesof cholestatic jaundice:hepatitis, cirrhosis, gallstones
andpancreatic cancer. There aremore than these four causes for cholestatic jaundice, but, as noted in [36],wehave simplified
the example for illustrative purpose. Suppose to have the following (coherent) possibility assessment:Π(H) = 1, Π(C1) =
0.58, Π(G) = Π(C2) = 0.4. Let us consider also an evidence E and the following possibilistic likelihood:
Π(E|H) = 0.2, Π(E|C1) = 0.3, Π(E|G) = 0.5, Π(E|C2) = 0.4.
By Theorem 5 the global assessment is coherent and we can apply the above Bayes procedure for updating the initial
distribution on H, C1, G, C2. It implies, first of all
Π(E) = max{min(Π(E|H),Π(H)),
min(Π(E|C1),Π(C1)),min(Π(E|G),Π(G)),min(Π(E|C2),Π(C2))} = max{0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.4} = 0.4.
Then,
min{Π(D|E), 0.4} = min{Π(E|D),Π(D)}
for D an element of {H, C1, G, C2}, so one has
Π(H|E) = 0.2, Π(C1|E) = 0.3,
while Π(G|E) ∈ [0.4, 1] and Π(C2|E) ∈ [0.4, 1]. Then, for G|E and C2|E we get an interval of coherent values and at this
stage we do not have any reason to choose one value instead of another one: the only constraint we have, sinceΠ(·|E)must
be a (normalized) possibility, is that max{Π(G|E),Π(C2|E)} = 1.
4. Computational issues
We conclude this first part devoted to the presentation of the results necessary to improve an inferential procedure, such
as that ruling medical diagnosis, with some considerations about computational aspects.
In particular, in this section we describe and analyze algorithms that can be used for checking the coherence and for
extending possibilistic assessments.
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These algorithms have similar purposes as those for checking the coherence and for computing the extension of a proba-
bilistic assessment (both for unconditional and conditional cases). Neverthelessmethods used in the possibilistic framework
are rather different than the probabilistic counterparts. Indeed the latter case essentially needs numerical computations: co-
herence check and enlargement of a probabilistic assessment are usually performed by some operational research methods
(for instance using column generation technique as in [39]), even if there exist also mixed numerical–symbolic solutions, as
[1].
The classical method of checking coherence of a conditional probabilistic assessment is based on a recursively defined
sequence of systems, as shown in [9]. The major drawback of this approach is that all the atoms need to be generated,
and therefore it requires in the worst case an exponential amount of memory space. Some heuristics useful to simplify the
problem in some particular situations, called locally strong coherence, are described in [5].
4.1. Unconditional case
To check the coherence of an unconditional possibility assessmentΠ , it is possible to use Algorithm1, which implements
the technique described in Theorem 1. In all the algorithms of this section we assume that the assessment is represented by
a linear sequence of events F and by a function Π : F → [0, 1]. Moreover, the events in F are increasingly ordered with
respect to Π , i.e. Π(Ei) ≤ Π(Ei+1) for i = 1, . . . , n − 1.
Algorithm 1 Checking the coherence of a possibility assessment
function CHECK–COHE(Π )
if Π(En) < 1 then
if L(1) = ∅ then return FALSE
end if
for i ← 1 to n do
if Ei ∧ L(Π(Ei)) = ∅ then return FALSE
end for
return TRUE
end function
Indeed, for each Ei ∈ F with Ei = ∅, one must verify that Fi = Ei ∧ L(Π(Ei)) = ∅ for i = 1, . . . , n and, in the case
that maxi Π(Ei) < 1, also F0 = L(1) = ∅ must be satisfied. One can check that an event Fi is not impossible by means of
any algorithm for the propositional satisfiability (in the following called SAT solver). It is easy to see that the procedure calls
the SAT solver at most n + 1 times. Therefore, its computational cost is exponential, according to the cost of best known
methods for satisfiability problem.
However, we overcome the main computational problem consisting on generating the atoms, as required in system S
(see (2)), whose number is, in the worst case, exponential with respect to the number of events.
The computation of the maximal coherent possibility value π∗(A) for a new unconditional event A is performed by
Algorithm 2, which uses Theorem 2.
Algorithm 2 Extension a possibility assessment – upper bound
function EXTE–UP(Π, A)
if A ∧ L(1) = ∅ then return 1
for i ← n downto 1 do
if A ∧ L(Π(Ei)) = ∅ then return Π(Ei)
end for
return 0
end function
The structure of Algorithm 2 is similar to Algorithm 1, with the difference that the former ends as soon as it finds the first
index j such that A ∧ L(Π(Ej)) = ∅. Its computational cost is then the same of Algorithm 1.
In order to compute the minimal coherent possibility value π∗(A) for A, we use a linear search through the set V ={0, 1, Π(Ei) for i = 1, . . . , n}which finds the minimum value π ∈ V such that the assessment Π ∪ {(A, π)} is coherent.
Algorithm 3 needs at most n calls to CHECK–COHE, which corresponds to O(n2) calls to the SAT solver.
4.2. Conditional case
FromTheorem4, it follows that to check coherenceof a conditional possibility assessment is equivalent to solve a sequence
of k systems, where k ≤ n (i.e. the number of conditional events).
Moreover, from Theorem 3 and Remark 3, each compatible system (6) in the sequence admits a maximal solution whose
values are in V . Even if the system is not compatible, it is possible to find a maximal vector of values in V which satisfies all
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Algorithm 3 Extending a possibility assessment – lower bound
function EXTE–LOW(Π, A)
π∗ ← 0
i ← 0
while not CHECK–COHE(Π ∪ {(A, π∗)}) do
i ← i + 1
π∗ ← Π(Ei)
end while
return π∗
end function
the constraints except the normalization equation
max
Cr∈C˜γ
zγr = 1.
Therefore, the strategy we propose is to look for the maximal solution to each system, by removing the normalization
constraint.
The major computational drawback of trying to directly solve systems S∗γ is the exponential number of unknowns, since
each atom must be explicitly generated. To overcome this problem, it is possible to use a symbolic way of representing
groups of unknowns and constraints. In fact, we can denote the set of all the atoms in C˜γ by means of 2n compound events.
Instead of using an unknown for each atom, we use only 2n unknowns which represent the values of
ai = max
Cr⊆Ei∧Hi
zγr and bi = max
Cr⊆Eci ∧Hi
zγr ,
respectively. The maximal solution of each S∗γ is then computed by means of an iterative method, described in Algorithm 4.
In Algorithms 4 and 5, the set I contains the indices of the remaining conditional events, while J′ and J′′ the indices of the
Ei ∧ Hi’s and Eci ∧ Hi’s, whose possibility value can increase, respectively.
Moreover, a, b is the solution of the previous system.
Algorithm 4Maximal solution
functionMAX–SOLUTION(I, J′, J′′, a, b)
a ← a
b ← b
for all j ∈ J′ do aj ← Π(Ej|Hj)
for all j ∈ J′′ do bj ← 1
repeat
(a′, b′) ← (a, b)
for all j ∈ J′ do
while Aj ∧ L(aj) = ∅ do bj ← aj ← V−(aj)
end for
for all j ∈ J′′ do
while Bj ∧ L(bj) = ∅ do bj ← V−(bj)
end for
until (a, b) = (a′, b′) or maxj∈I{aj, bj} < 1
return (a, b)
end function
The functionMAX–SOLUTION is essentially a search process in the lattice V2|I| which starts with the maximum possible
values for aj , with j ∈ J′, (which corresponds to Π(Ej|Hj)) and for bk , with k ∈ J′′, (which is 1), and checks whether these
values are acceptable, i.e. they can be obtained by a complete solution (i.e. on the atoms) zγ . This can be solved by checking
the coherence of an unconditional possibility assessment, with the difference that for γ ∈ (0, 1]
L(γ ) = ∧
aj<γ
(Ecj ∨ Hcj ) ∧
∧
bk<γ
(Ek ∨ Hck).
If these values are acceptable, the maximal solution is found. Otherwise, the values of aj ’s and bk ’s are lowered by means of
the function
V−(t) = max{v ∈ V : v < t},
while satisfying the equations
ai = min{Π(Ei|Hi),max{ai, bi}}, i ∈ I.
M. Baioletti et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 580–598 591
The search process always terminates, because in the worst case aj ’s and bk ’s assume the values aj ’s and bk ’s, respectively,
which always constitute a non normalized solution of the current system. Since each unknown can assume onlyO(n) values,
the entire process needs O(n2) calls to the SAT solver.
The overall Algorithm 5 builds and solves the sequence of systems, by calling MAX–SOLUTION. At each step, the index
sets I, J′, J′′ are updated with respect to the maximal solution for the current system.
The process terminateswhen a non normalized solution for a system is found, in this case the assessment is not coherent,
or when all the events are eliminated, in this case the assessment is coherent.
Algorithm 5 Checking the coherence of a conditional assessment
function CHECK–COHE–COND(Π )
I ← {1, . . . , n}
J′ ← J′′ ← I
a ← 0; b ← 0
for all i ∈ I do Ai ← Ei ∧ Hi; Bi ← Eci ∧ Hi
while I = ∅ do
(a, b) ←MAX–SOLUTION(I, J′, J′′, a, b)
if max{ai, bi : i ∈ I} < 1 then return FALSE
for all j ∈ J′ do Aj ← Aj ∧ L(aj)
for all j ∈ J′′ do Bj ← Bj ∧ L(bj)
I ← {i ∈ I : max(ai, bi) < 1}
M ← max{aj, bk : j ∈ J′, k ∈ J′′}
J′ ← {j ∈ I : aj = M}
J′′ ← {j ∈ I : bj = M}
end while
return TRUE
end function
Since this procedure needs to solve a sequence of at most n systems, it requires O(n3) calls to the SAT solver.
The computation of the maximal coherent value π∗ for a new conditional event E|H can be performed by exploiting
Remark 5. Algorithm 6 is therefore a modification of Algorithm 5, in which the assessment Π is enlarged by assigning the
possibility value 1 to E|H. If the assessment is coherent, then π∗ = 1. On the other hand, if the assessment is not coherent,
then the maximal solution of the last system allows to compute π∗ as an+1, i.e. the possibility of E ∧ H. Obviously, the cost
of Algorithm 6 is the same as the cost of Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 6 Extending a conditional possibility assessment – upper bound
function EXTE–COND–UP(Π, E,H)
Π ← Π ∪ {(E|H, 1)}
I ← {1, . . . , n + 1}
J′ ← J′′ ← I
a ← 0; b ← 0
for all i ∈ I do Ai ← Ei ∧ Hi; Bi ← Eci ∧ Hi
while I = ∅ do
(a, b) ←MAX–SOLUTION(I, J′, J′′, a, b)
if max{ai, bi : i ∈ I} < 1 then return an+1
for all j ∈ J′ do Aj ← Aj ∧ L(aj)
for all j ∈ J′′ do Bj ← Bj ∧ L(bj)
I ← {i ∈ I : max(ai, bi) < 1}
M ← max{aj, bk : j ∈ J′, k ∈ J′′}
J′ ← {j ∈ I : aj = M}
J′′ ← {j ∈ I : bj = M}
end while
return 1
end function
In analogywith the unconditional case, the computation of theminimal coherent value, as described in Algorithm 7, uses
a search process, which is the exact equivalent to Algorithm 3. Since CHECK–COHE–COND is called at most n times, O(n4)
calls to the SAT solver are needed.
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Algorithm 7 Extending a conditional possibility assessment – lower bound
function EXTE–COND–LOW(Π, E,H)
π∗ ← 0
i ← 0
while not CHECK–COHE–COND(Π ∪ {(E|H, π∗)}) do
i ← i + 1
π∗ ← Π(Ei|Hi)
end while
return π∗
end function
5. Possibilistic inference starting from probabilistic information
In this section we show that possibilistic and probabilistic information can be handled together. In fact, a possibility can
arise from a partial probabilistic assessment and moreover the probabilistic likelihood can be syntactically embedded also
in possibilistic context.
5.1. Probability extension and possibility
We first recall a result given in [12,13], showing that the upper envelope of all the possible extensions of a probability
defined on an algebra to another algebra is a possibility if (and only if) the set of the atoms of the two algebras satisfy a
particular logical condition (called weak logical independence).
Actually this result is connected with that given in [29], which allows to compute the possibility distribution determined
by a nested set of atoms.
Let L,L′ be two partitions of Ω , for any E′j ∈ L′, we denote by Aj the minimal (with respect to the inclusion) event
logically dependent on L containing E′j , that is
Aj =
∨
Ei∧E′j =∅
Ei.
Obviously, Aj is an element of the algebra B spanned by L.
Definition 5. Given two partitions L,L′ of Ω , for any E′i ∈ L′, we consider the corresponding Ai ∈ B. L′ is weakly logically
independent of L (in symbols, L′⊥ wL) if, for any given E′i ∈ L′, every other E′k ∈ L′ (k = i) satisfies at least one of the
following conditions
• E′k ⊆ Ai• E′k ∧ Ej = ∅ for any Ej ⊆ Ai.
As proved in [12] the notion of weakly logically independent partitions is symmetric even if it does not seem at a first
sight. Moreover, two weakly logically independent partitions can be characterized as follows (see [12] Theorem 1):
Theorem 6. LetL = {E1, . . . , Ei, . . . , En} andL′ = {E′1, . . . , E′j , . . . , E′m} be two partitions ofΩ . The following two conditions
are equivalent:
(1) L′⊥ wL;
(2) there exists a permutation of the indices 1, . . . ,m such that the corresponding events A1, . . . , Aj, . . . , Am are completely
ordered by inclusion.
As it iswell known, given a probability on a partition, the upper envelope of the possible extensions on any other partition
is a plausibility (see [11,37,23]). However, if the logical conditions among events of the two families assure that the partitions
areweakly logically independent, theupper envelope ismore than aplausibility, in fact (the completely included set of events
of Theorem 6 can be computed) and the plausibility is a possibility (see [12, Theorem 3]):
Theorem 7. Let L,L′ be two partitions ofΩ and B′ the algebra spanned by L′ . Let P be a probability distribution on L and P the
upper envelope of the classP = {P′} of all the probabilities extending P ontoL∪B′. IfL′⊥ wL, then P is a possibilitymeasure onB′.
In the samepaper it has been proved thatweakly logically independent partitions not only rule the transition fromproba-
bility to possibility, but also the otherway round: for any possibilityΠ on an algebraB there exist a partition,weakly logically
independent of the set of atoms of B, and a relevant probability distributionwhose upper extension on B coincides withΠ .
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The obtained upper extension of a probability measure is simply the possibility measure induced by a nested random set
and an initial probabilitymeasure as in [29]. In fact, Theorem6 assures that ifL andL′ areweakly logically independent, then
the events in L can be arranged in a way that the set of events A1, ..., Am are completely ordered by inclusion. Then, from
the quoted result in [29], any set of upper bounds on them induces an upper probability, which is a possibility. So, Theorem
7 points out directly the relationship between the upper envelope of a probability and possibility, starting from a probability
on a partition. About relationships between nested random sets and possibility measures there is a rich literature, see for
instance [20,34,40,43–45].
Example 4. Let us consider the exhaustive and exclusive events H, C1, G, C2, of Example 3. Suppose to have information
only on another class of exclusive and exhaustive events {O1,O2,O3}, such that the outcome O1 is compatible only with H;
while O2 is compatible only with H and C1 and O3 is compatible with all the possible causes. The information is expressed
by the following probability distribution: P(O1) = 0.42, P(O2) = 0.18, P(O3) = 0.4.
Since the two above partitions are weakly logically independent, the upper envelope of the extensions of the probability
on O1,O2,O3 is then a possibility on the algebra generated by H, C1, G, C2. Actually,
Π(H) = 1, Π(C1) = 0.58, Π(G) = Π(C2) = 0.4
since C2 and G are compatible only with O3, while C1 with O2 and O3 and H with all the three elements.
5.2. Probabilistic and possibilistic likelihood
Given a probability distribution onL′ = {Kj} and a (probabilistic) likelihood on E|Hi,withL′⊥ wL, consider the following
problem: is it possible to infer on theeventsHi|E,by taking into account all the information?Apossibleprocedure is toupdate
any possible probability, which extends P to L, by using probabilistic Bayes rule and then to compute the upper envelope.
We propose here a different procedure consisting on directly updating the upper envelope of probabilities extending P on
L. The “syntactic enabling” is given by the following theorem proving that a probabilistic likelihood can be seen also as a
possibilistic likelihood.
Theorem 8. Let C = {E|Hi}i=1,...,n be such that {Hi}i=1,...,n is a finite partition ofΩ. For any function f : C → [0, 1] such that
f (E|Hi) = 0 if E ∧ Hi = ∅ and f (E|Hi) = 1 if Hi ⊆ E (11)
(and f assumes any value in [0, 1] for any E|Hi, with ∅ = E ∧ Hi = E) the following conditions hold:
(i) f is a coherent conditional probability,
(ii) f is a coherent conditional possibility.
Proof. Condition (i) has been proved in [10]. Condition (ii) is a direct consequence of Theorem 5. 
The above result suggests that, from a syntactic point of view, we can use a probabilistic likelihood as a possibilistic one,
so, for instance in Example 3, not only the “prior possibility” can be derived by a probabilistic assessment (see Example 4),
but also the likelihood used for updating the prior can be probabilistic.
Consider now a different situation: given a probability distribution on L′ = {Kj} and a likelihood on {E|Hi}, Hi ∈ L (with
L and L′ partitions), we are interested in making inference on the events Ar |E, with Ar elements of the partition L∗. If L∗
is weakly logically independent of L′ and L is a refinement of L∗, then we can use the Bayes possibilistic formula, when a
coherent extension of the likelihood on the events E|Ar is available.
Actually, a coherent conditional possibility Π(E|·) extending a likelihood on {E} × Bo can be reread as a function f (·)
defined on B by putting f (∅) = 0 and f (A) = Π(E|A) for each A ∈ Bo. This function f is not a possibility, in general. The
following result provides some inequalities among the values of the extension, induced by coherence:
Lemma 1. Let C be a finite family of conditional events {E|Hi}, with {Hi} a partition of Ω , and denote byH the algebra spanned
by the Hi’s and Ho = H \ {∅}. If Π : C → [0, 1] is a (coherent) conditional possibility, then any coherent extension of Π to
C′ = {E|H : H ∈ Ho} is such that, for every H, K ∈ H,
min{Π(E|H),Π(E|K)} ≤ Π(E|H ∨ K) ≤ max{Π(E|H),Π(E|K)} .
Proof. As already noted previously,Π can be extended to a coherent conditional possibility on C′, and the latter in turn can
be coherently extended on C′′ = C′ ∪ {H|K : H, K ∈ H}. By axiom (C3) of Definition 1 with ⊕ = max and 
 = min, this
satisfies the following equality:
Π(E|H ∨ K) = max{min[Π(E|H),Π(H|H ∨ K)],min[Π(E|K),Π(K|H ∨ K)]},
The conclusion follows, since at least one of Π(H|H ∨ K) and Π(K|H ∨ K)must be equal to 1. 
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From Lemma 1 it follows that if there exists a coherent extension ofΠ(E|·) on C′, monotone with respect to inclusion⊆,
one has necessarily for every H, K ∈ H
Π(E|H ∨ K) = max{Π(E|H),Π(E|K)}.
The following theorem assures the existence of such extension.
Theorem 9. Let C and Ho as in Lemma 1 and let f : C → [0, 1] be any function, satisfying (9). Then for any g extending f on
K = {E} × Ho and such that
g(E|H ∨ K) = max{g(E|H), g(E|K)}
for every H, K ∈ Ho the following conditions hold:
(i) g is a coherent conditional probability,
(ii) g is a coherent conditional possibility.
Proof. The proof of (i) is in [10]. To prove (ii) it is sufficient to consider Π(Hi) = 1 for any Hi ∈ C. In fact, from Theorem 8 f
is a coherent conditional possibility and from Theorem 5 is globally coherent with Π on C. 
Among the coherent extensions onK = {E}×Ho of a probabilistic likelihooddefinedon C, there is also the anti-monotone
one (with respect to the inclusion⊆) as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Let C,Ho and f as in Theorem 9. Then for any g extending f on K = {E} × Ho and such that
g(E|H ∨ K) = min{g(E|H), g(E|K)}
for every H, K ∈ Ho the following conditions hold:
(i) g is a coherent conditional probability,
(ii) g is a coherent conditional possibility.
Proof. The proof of (i) is in [10]. To prove (ii), we recall first of all that f is a coherent conditional possibility from Theorem
8. Let us order H1, . . . ,Hn in such a way that f (E|Hi) ≤ f (E|Hi+1) for any i = 1, . . . , n− 1. The coherence of g follows from
Theorem 3 by considering the class of nested possibilities {Π0, . . . , Πn−1} defined as follows: for k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 let
Πk(Hk+1) = 1 and Πk(Hi) = 0 for i ≥ k + 2. 
Theorem 10 and Theorem 9 provide bounds for the likelihood on E × Ho over the set of possible extensions.
The next example shows the role of the two above results concerning the two choices for the extension of the
likelihood.
Example 5 (Example 3 continued). Consider the same events H, C1, G, C2 of Example 3, and the incompatible events Hi, Gj
(i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2) with∨3i=1 Hi = H and G1 ∨ G2 = G. The following likelihood
Π(E|H1) = Π(E|H2) = 0.1, Π(E|H3) = 0.2,
Π(E|C1) = 0.3, Π(E|G1) = 0.2, Π(E|G2) = 0.5, Π(E|C2) = 0.4
can be extended to {E}× {H, C1, G, C2} by taking themaximum (see Theorem 9) and then, since we get the same likelihood
of Example 3, by considering the same prior possibility
Π(H) = 1, Π(C1) = 0.58, Π(G) = Π(C2) = 0.4
of the cited example (obtained from a probability assessment on a different partition), we get by applying the Bayes rule
obviously the same updated values.
While by extending the above likelihood to {E} × {H, C1, G, C2} by taking the minimum (see Theorem 10) we have
Π(E|H) = 0.1, Π(E|C1) = 0.3, Π(E|G) = 0.2, Π(E|C2) = 0.4
and by using the same prior we get firstly
Π(E) = max{0.1, 0.3, 0.2, 0.4} = 0.4
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and then,
Π(H|E) = 0.1, Π(C1|E) = 0.3, Π(G|E) = 0.2,
while Π(C2|E) ∈ [0.4, 1]. But, in this case, we are forced to take Π(C2|E) = 1 to have a possibility.
In this other example we show how the same function (defined on a proper set of conditional events) can be used either
as a probabilistic likelihood or as a possibilistic one. Moreover, the concept of weakly logically independent partitions allows
us to choose between a probabilistic inferential process or a possibilistic one. Notice that, aswe expect, the inferential results
in the two models are in general different.
Example 6. LetL = {K1, K2, K3, K4, K5} andL′ = {H1,H2,H3,H4} be two partitions ofΩ such thatL⊥ wL′, withH1 ⊆ K1,
H2 ⊆ K1, H3 ∧ K1 = ∅ = H3 ∧ K2, H3 ∧ Kj = ∅ for j = 3, 4, 5 and H4 ∧ Ki = ∅ for i = 1, ..., 5. Consider the following
probability distribution on L: P(K1) = P(K4) = P(K5) = 15 , P(K2) = 25 and P(K3) = 0.
Introduce the upper envelope of the class P of probabilities extending P on B′, where B′ is the algebra generated by L′.
From Theorem 7, this upper probability is a possibility assuming on the elements of L′ the values Π(H1) = Π(H2) = 15 ,
Π(H3) = 35 and Π(H4) = 1.
Consider an event E such that (K3∨K4) ⊆ E, and a function f on {E}×L′ defined as f (E|H1) = 25 , f (E|H2) = f (E|H3) = 15
and f (E|H4) = 45 .
As stated in Theorem 8, f can be looked as a probabilistic or as a possibilistic likelihood.
If we interpret f as a coherent conditional possibility we can use it together with the “prior possibilities” {Π(Hi)} to
calculate the “posterior possibilities” {Π(Hi|E)} with a Bayesian-like procedure.
So, we have
Π(E) = max
i=1,...,4{Π(E ∧ Hi)} = maxi=1,...,4{min{Π(Hi),Π(E|Hi)}} =
4
5
.
By putting xi = Π(Hi|E) for i = 1, . . . , 4, the posterior possibilities are obtained as solutions of the equations
min{Π(Hi),Π(E|Hi)} = min{xi, Π(E)}, i = 1, . . . , 4.
Thus, Π(H1|E) = Π(H2|E) = Π(H3|E) = 15 and Π(H4|E) ∈
[
4
5
, 1
]
.
On the other hand, if we consider f as a probabilistic likelihood we can compute, by using P on Ki (i = 1, ..., 5), the
posterior probabilities {P(Hi|E)} resorting to the generalized probabilistic inference procedure (see [7]) and P(E) ∈ [ 1125 , 45 ],
obtaining P(H1|E) ∈
[
0, 1
6
]
, P(H2|E) ∈
[
0, 1
11
]
, P(H3|E) ∈
[
0, 3
11
]
and P(H4|E) ∈
[
2
3
, 1
]
.
6. Some examples in medical diagnosis
We analyze some examples related to medical diagnosis to show how to apply the theory described in the previous
sections, when we do not deal with prior and likelihood defined on (or reducible to) the same partition.
First of all we briefly sketch the main steps of a general procedure for handling uncertainty in the process of medical
diagnosis, possibly implemented in a decision support system.
The proposed interactive method initially requires to have the following information:
(1) A family of hypotheses supplied by the physician: they correspond to possible diseases Hi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) which
could explain a given initial piece of information referring to the specific situation (anamnesis). No structure and no
simplifying and unrealistic assumption (such as mutual exclusiveness and exhaustivity) is required for this family of
events;
(2) All the logical relations between these hypotheses, either already included in the knowledge base, or given by the
doctor on the basis of the specific situation;
(3) A possibility assessment on the given set of hypotheses. Clearly, this is not a complete assessment, since these events
have been chosen as the most natural according to the doctor’s experience: so usually they do not constitute, in
general, a partition of the certain eventΩ , and therefore the extension to other events of these possibility evaluations
is not necessarily unique. Moreover, a doctor often assigns degrees of belief directly to sets of hypotheses (for example,
onemay suspect that one of the diseases the patient suffers from is an infectious one, but he is not able to commit any
belief to any particular infectious disease). These possibilities could derive from a coherent probability assessment on
a different suitable set of events as an upper probability (see for instance [22,27,32,12,13]);
(4) A database consisting of conditional events E|K and their relevant possibilities Π(E|K), where each event K is a
possible diseasewhich is in someway related to the given hypothesesHi, while each evidence E comes from a suitable
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evidential test. These possibilities could have been obtained directly by means of a database containing possibilistic
or fuzzy information or by probabilistic data, possibly coming from different sources.
Then, once the above data are available, first of all, we need to check coherence of the assessment Π(Hi). If the assess-
ment turns out not being coherent, the doctor can be driven to a different assignment based on the related mathematical
relations contained in the corresponding system. Another way-out is to look for suitable “maximal” subfamilies of the set
{H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} for which the assignment is coherent, and then proceed by resorting to the extension theorem. Obviously,
it is possible to have more than one maximal subset. In this case the choice can be made by the decision maker or field
expert taking into account personal considerations or information (e.g. he/she could be unwilling to change the assessment
on some events). Otherwise it is possible to chose a suitable “distance” in order to look for the coherent assessment requiring
a “minor” change.
On the contrary, coherence of the possibilities Π(Hi) allows to go on by checking now the coherence of the whole
assessment including also the possibilitiesΠ(E|K). The whole assignment (prior possibilities and “possibilistic likelihood”)
can be incoherent even if the two separate assessment are coherent.
On the basis of the results obtained by means of the evidential tests, the doctor can now update the possibilities of the
hypotheses Hi, i.e. he assesses the conditional possibilities Π(Hi|E). Then he needs to check again coherence of the whole
assessment including the latter and the former possibility evaluations.
When prior possibilities and possibilistic likelihood are jointly coherent, the doctor can get values representing each
posterior possibility (of a disease Hi given an evidence E) by using the extension theorem. Usually the extension is not
unique and we can compute upper and lower bounds for the posterior possibilities Π(Hi|E).
Fig. 1 shows a flow chart of the described general updating procedure.
Example 7. A patient feels serious generalized abdominal pains, fever and retches. The doctor puts forth the following
hypotheses concerning the possible relevant disease:
H1 = “ileus”,
H2 = “peritonitis”,
H3 = “abdominal inflammation”.
Moreover the doctor assumes a natural logical condition such as H1 ∧ H2 = H1 ∧ H3 = H2 ∧ H3. Correspondingly we
have then five atoms A1 = H1∧H2∧H3, A2 = H1∧Hc2∧Hc3, A3 = Hc1∧H2∧Hc3, A4 = Hc1∧Hc2∧H3, A5 = Hc1∧Hc2∧Hc3.
The doctor initially gives these possibility assessments: Π(H1) = 12 , Π(H2) = 13 , Π(H3) = 15 .
By using Algorithm 1 we can prove that this (partial) assessment is coherent.
The doctor considers now the event: E = “pressing in particular points of the abdomendoes not increase pain” andhe gives the
following logical and probabilistic information E ∧ H1 = E ∧ H2, Π(E|H1) = 1, Π(E|Hc1 ∧ Hc2) = 25 , Π(E|Hc1 ∧ H2) = 0 .
Obviously, the latter assignment is coherent, since it refers to a (trivial) partition (with respect to the conditioning events),
according to Theorem 8.
The updating of that assessment requires that the “whole” prior and possibilistic likelihood must be jointly coherent. In
this case coherence does not hold: to see it, it is enough to consider the restriction Π(E|H1),Π(H1),Π(H3).
Fig. 1. General updating procedure flow chart.
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The relevant atoms are
C1 = A1 ∧ Ec, C2 = A2 ∧ Ec, C3 = A4 ∧ Ec, C4 = A1 ∧ E, C5 = A4 ∧ E,
and the corresponding system is⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{x1, x2, x4} = 12 ,
max{x1, x3, x4, x5} = 15 ,
x4 = min{1,max{x1, x2, x4}},
xr ≥ 0, r = 1, . . . , 5,
max{x1, . . . , x5} = 1,
which admits no solution: a contradiction is obtained since from the first and third equations x4 = 12 , but this contradicts
the second equation.
The next example shows that it is possible to update (prior) possibility, also in unusual situations (such as when we
assume that the diseases are not mutually exclusive), when coherence of the “global” (i.e. prior and likelihood together)
assessment holds.
Example 8. A patient arrives at the hospital showing symptoms of choking. The doctor considers the following hypotheses
concerning the patient situation:
A = “cardiac insufficiency”,
B = “asthma attack”,
C = “respiratory problem”,
D = “cardiac insufficiency caused by asthma attack”,
with the logical constraints A ∧ C = ∅ and D ⊆ A ∧ B.
Consider the followingassessmentΠ(A∨B|A∨B∨C) = Π(C|A∨B) = 0.6, Π(D|A) = Π(D|A∧B) = 0.4, Π(A|A∨B) =
0.7.
The atoms spanned by the above events are C1 = Ac ∧ Bc ∧ C ∧ Dc , C2 = Ac ∧ B ∧ C ∧ Dc , C3 = Ac ∧ B ∧ Cc ∧ Dc ,
C4 = A∧ B∧ Cc ∧ Dc , C5 = A∧ B∧ Cc ∧ D, C6 = A∧ Bc ∧ Cc ∧ Dc , C7 = Ac ∧ Bc ∧ Cc ∧ Dc . By using Algorithm 5 we could
prove that this assessment is a coherent conditional possibility.
Then, the assessment can be extended, for example, to the event A ∧ B|A. We need to calculate the upper and lower
bound values for the possibility of the new event. In [17] we proved that all values within these two bounds give coherent
extensions. In Remark 4 we notice that these extremes can vary, in this case, in the set {0, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7, 1}.
To compute the lower bound, through the procedure implemented in Algorithm 7, it is easy to check that the value
Π(A∧ B|A) = 0 together with the given assessment is not coherent, while the coherence fulfils for the valueΠ(A∧ B|A) =
0.4, which is the minimum coherent value for A ∧ B|A. For the upper possibility we can easily prove, through Algorithm 6,
that the value 1 is coherent. Then, for the possibility of A ∧ B|A, the coherent values are [0.4, 1].
7. Conclusion
In order to apply possibilistic theory to real-world problems, it is necessary to point out a general inferential setting,
related to a suitable conditioning notion, able to deal with assessments.
This paper is based on a general axiomatic definition of conditioning and a relevant coherence notion, which differs from
those introduced in [48] essentially based on “natural” and “regular” extensions. In fact those given in [48] are based on
specific rules for conditioning without introducing an axiomatic approach. The relationship between our coherence and
those in [48] is out of the aim of this paper, however it would be interesting to deepen such aspects in a future work.
Another open aspect is related to the potential applications coming from real-world problems, we quote just medical
applications, but it would be relevant for general diagnosis problems and virtual web applications such as that presented
in [46]. In this paper we give some algorithmic schemes that could be useful to develop tools able to handle the proposed
methods in the aforementioned applications.
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